The Need to Look Beyond the Nuclear Binary: Optimists vs Pessimists

By Amey Velangi

Since the advent of nuclear energy, its weaponised application in the war scenario has been a major security concern for world peace. The lone usage of nuclear weapons in World War II on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has provided a preview of the devastation that such a lethal treatment of atoms can cause to human lives. The natural consequence of such a wide scope of its usage in geopolitics is very intriguing and explorative in its nature.

The strategic arms race after its potential impact on deterrence dynamics between the adversary has jolted the theorists in international relations to delve deep into the act of stockpiling of nuclear weapons by the states. This has led to a lot of strategic concerns for the states that possess nuclear weapons and those that do not possess them. The security dilemma between ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ has widened in different regions and in different aspects of their security concerns.

Considering this race to stockpile as many nuclear weapons as possible, keeping its adversary at its focal point, would have dangerous consequences on the overall security situation. Analysing this issue, Kenneth Waltz and Scott D. Sagan in their famous debate about the nuclear stockpiling between vulnerable nations and its implications on the safety and security in the world, have theorised the concept to nuclearise or denuclearise the nations in a security dilemma, so that the possibility of the escalation of a conflict can be reduced.

This article will mainly delve into this theoretical prediction made by both theorists, revolving around the debate to answer the question and critically analyse them with a logical deduction of the ground situations. It would also take into consideration other works in the same area.

Optimistic vs Pessimistic Theoretical Approach and Beyond

Optimistic Nuclear Proponent

The optimistic view of nuclear proliferation by Kenneth Waltz, emphasises the efficacy of possessing a nuclear arsenal by nations who are in a major nuclear security dilemma. Waltz puts forth the notion that if given possession of nuclear weapons, each nation with the deterrence effect would not escalate the conflict to a nuclear one, as that would ensure mutually assured destruction (MAD) to both. Waltz bases his argument on the fact that since their creation, despite multiple arms races and the occasional nuclear threat that did not escalate, overall nuclear weapons have been instrumental, in the form of a deterrent, in maintaining peace.

If the number of nukes increased in aggregate terms in both the scales of the power balance, it would actually decrease the possibility of an all-out nuclear war and would restrict the conflict to a conventional one. (Karl, 1996-97).

But I would like to point out certain theoretical misgivings on which this logically persuading argument is based on. Waltz here majorly talks about a possible situation, where the risk involved is being gauged by rational actors. But seldom is that case where all the states and their leaders are possibly rational actors. In nations like North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran where there is apprehension about the behaviour and ideological standings of their leaders, it becomes difficult to predict their stance on rational lines.

Also, increasing the number of nukes would also defeat the purpose of nuclear non-proliferation or Zero Nukes objective. Waltz by providing his nuclear optimism theory, he somewhere diverges from his structurally realist stance as well (Knopf, 2002). Many nations do use non-state actors as a proxy to their strategic objectives and if such states possess nuclear arms, that complicates the situation in dealing with them. Pakistan would be the best-on-ground example of this, as it uses its nukes as a bargaining chip against every international proposition against it. Waltz’s optimistic proposition focuses more on the lines of what ‘ought to be’ the nuclear situation if done this, rather than what is the realistic behaviour of the states.

Pessimistic Nuclear Deniers

The pessimistic view proposed by Scott Sagan, says that nuclear proliferation would not just escalate the threat levels for the nations involved, but it would also deteriorate the overall peace situation in the whole world. Sagan argues that the spread of nuclear weapons is a dangerous trend that could lead to a nuclear war. He argues that the more countries that have nuclear weapons, the greater the risk of a catastrophic event. Sagan believes that the only way to prevent a nuclear war is to reduce the number of countries that have nuclear weapons. He also talks about the nature of the military authorities that are primarily responsible for the operational aspects of a nuclear weapon.

The organisational proclivity of the military is such that they have an inherently parochial view that would consider their power position and not the larger interests of the country. He, therefore argues that a civilian authority needs to have a dominant, decisive role in which the red button should be authorised. But that is not the case with the nations today. Most of the nations today, which aspire to be nuclear power, are either ruled by military governments or their civilian governments do not have much say in the decision-making. (Knopf, 2002).

If we look at Sagan’s argument, it looks very comforting and idealistic in its initial view. But when we look at the nuclear behaviour of various nations that are ruled by their military, we have no empirical evidence to say that they have acted irrationally and used nuclear weapons. The Indo-Pak war in 1999, just after both nations had tested their weapons, were at loggerheads with each other. This was the first time that two newly weaponised nations were in direct confrontation with nukes in their strategic arsenal. But even when Pakistan’s desperate need to buy a crushing defeat to India was so high, it did not consider using its nuclear option (Synder, 1961).

Also, the ‘Nuclear Taboo’, by Nina Tannenwald, attached towards using nuclear weapons have prevented many nuclear powers from using it (Tannenwald, 1999). Also looking at the current war between Russia and Ukraine, a counterfactual study of what if Ukraine had refused to give up its nuclear weapons and had remained a nuclear power, would Russia consider this option of aggression? Would the rational deterrence theory have played a critical role in preventing this war? All these empirical, moral and counterfactual arguments would put Sagan’s stance into an idealist scale of weight.

Critically Analysing the Debate

The debate of Waltz and Sagan has set the basic theoretical platform for nuclear proliferation, the state behaviour and its overall implications on the peace and security of the world. It has significantly benchmarked the primary views on the usage of atomic split for destructive purposes, upon which many other scholars and thinkers have built. P.D. Feaver has mentioned the debate as useful in knowing the two sides of the same spectrum, but the intermediate operations and the reality check have something that is missing (Feaver, 2008).

Looking at the real dealing with the nuclear powers, that is the ones that already possess the weapon shows how difficult and unrealistic it is to give up what they already have and that which gives them a strategic edge over others. The world and its functioning being essentially in an anarchic state of affairs, self-help and self-defence are the two true testaments of safeguarding one’s state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Thus, states racing to develop nuclear weapons for their own security interests would be a perennial problem for those who would absolutely subscribe to Sagan’s pessimistic nuclear proliferation thought.

There is an essential need to come out of this binary of optimism and pessimism about nuclear proliferation as they do not paint an accurate picture of how nuclear states behave. Rather these approaches try to build their floating castles with an assumption of rationality in the first case and with a moralistic stance in the second, giving less consideration to the operational mechanics of how states weigh their strategic choices and on what basis or on what threat perception would they go for a nuclear option.

Paul Kapur has refuted the popular notion that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if India tries to get back Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK), by logically deducing many other factors that Pakistan would have to deal with if it considers that option. But it is uncertain if it can be used in the case of Baluchistan or any other state being balkanised from the Pakistani state. This shows the differential treatment in the case of states that may want to recalibrate their strategic options in consonance with the changing geopolitical, geoeconomic and other external and internal dynamics of a nation (Kapur, 2005).

Matthew Kroenig’s theory of nuclear proliferation examines the differential effects on different countries of nuclear proliferation. He argues that the threat nuclear proliferation poses to a particular state depends on that state’s ability to project military power. The spread of nuclear weapons is worse for states that have the ability to project conventional military power over a potential nuclear weapon state primarily because nuclear proliferation constrains their conventional military freedom of action.

On the other hand, nuclear proliferation is less threatening to, and can sometimes even improve the strategic environment of, states that cannot project power over a potential nuclear weapon state, because the spread of nuclear weapons disproportionately constrains other, more powerful states. This is another way of looking at the subject of nuclear proliferation where a differential and specified approach can be used for a particular region or a nation and its nuclear threat (Erik Gartzke, 2009).

The Need to Look to Beyond the Binary

The world and its functioning being essentially in an anarchic state of affairs, self-help and self-defence are the two true testaments of safeguarding one’s state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Thus, states racing to develop nuclear weapons for their own security interests would be a perennial problem for those who would absolutely subscribe to both Sagan’s pessimistic and Waltz’s nuclear proliferation thoughts.

Although they have rightly contributed their views, Waltz’s optimism seems to be more ambitious than pragmatic. And Sagan’s pessimism seems to be more moralistic than realistic. If a theory seems to get one important thing right, but many other things that are its ancillary components wrong, is it a successful theory? Optimists of proliferation correctly identifies one important element of proliferation, i.e. nuclear weapons compelling the states to be more cautious with their conflicts. But theorising a whole plethora of uncertainties of nuclear usage or non-usage around one assumption would bring inaccurate observations at sight.

Pessimists of proliferation seem to have an innate fear or reservation about the impact of nuclear weapons and the scale of destructiveness that would cause global mayhem. But building a theory around this fear and omitting the structural forces that make the states proliferate their nuclear arsenal would be like closing your eyes against reality and band-aid a wound that is deeply rooted. This is not to say that a good theory explains all the specificities of a subject, but a theory that can cover all the plausible certainties and uncertainties, with a comprehensive outlook can be said to have the required resources to draw a blanket statement of theory.

Conclusion

The whole debate here about whether more nuclear weapons would bring stability is more of a prescriptive theoretical proposition that completely focuses on the situation that should be or ‘ought to be’ and omits the descriptive analysis which portrays an accurate on-ground picture. The nuclear behaviour and nuclear response of a state cannot be completely predicted where multiple actors are playing their part in shaping the world order. There is an essential need to come out of this binary of optimism and pessimism about nuclear proliferation as they do not paint an accurate picture of how nuclear states behave.

Rather these approaches try to build their floating castles with an assumption of rationality in the first case and with a moralistic stance in the second, giving less consideration to the operational mechanics of how states weigh their strategic choices and on what basis or on what threat perception would they go for a nuclear option.

I would consider a ‘status quoist’ approach to be more appropriate to deal with nuclear proliferation. Here the stance would be to maintain the nuclear arsenals to their current state and not proliferate them. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can act as the watchdog for this vertical proliferation cap. For horizontal proliferation too, the status quo should be maintained and no new nuclear powers should enter the club. For this, the present nuclear club members should keep a tight vigilance on the aspiring nuclear powers and their ambitions. This would maintain the nuclear balance of power in its state that is appropriate to the needs.

Being the pioneers of this debate Waltz and Sagan need to be given their due for framing a broader area to think and deliberate upon, but we need to let loose of this obsession with this theoretical framework and try to look at the empirical basis on which nuclear proliferation is being made, rather than how it should be made. Thus, the question of whether more nuclear weapons would be better for the world need not require a straight-jacketed answer as the major debate itself revolves around normative postures and not on a convincingly empirical study of how states make decisions with or without nuclear weapons. Therefore, a more pragmatically objective view would help us know the nuclear game and its nuanced complexities.

All the views and opinions expressed are those of the author

References

Erik Gartzke, M. K. (2009). A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation. The Journal of Conflict Resolution.

Feaver, P. (2008). Optimists, Pessimists and Theories of Nuclear Management: Debate. Security Studies.

Kapur, S. (2005). India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not like Cold War. International Security.

Karl, D. (1996-97). Proliferation, Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers. International Security, 89-92.

Knopf, J. (2002). Recasting the Proliferation, Optimisim-Pessimism Debate . Institutional Archive of the Naval Post Graduate School, 47-49.

Synder, G. (1961). Detterence and Defence: Towards a Theory of National Security. Princeton University Press.

Tannenwald, N. (1999). The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use. International Organisation, 433-468.

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