By Dr. Cchavi Vasisht
On 24 April 2021 the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting was convened at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, with the view to reach a consensus on the situation in Myanmar apart from other issues such as community building efforts, recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, and other pressing issues of common interest to all ASEAN Member States. On the situation in Myanmar, the leaders agreed on the Five Point consensus (FPC). As the FPC marks the three-year anniversary on 24 April 2024, it is pertinent to reflect on the developments of each of these provisions. Over the period of three years, these provisions have often been criticised as mere diplomatic efforts which provide an ideal solution on paper but aren’t able to respond to the situation on the ground. Here we assess each of the provisions of FPC and provide a few suggestions to ensure implementation of the FPC.
The Suggestions
First, there shall be immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar and all parties shall exercise utmost restraint. This provision of the ASEAN FPC has failed miserably as neither side of the conflicting parties have given up arms. The violence continues unabated and has rather intensified and diversified in the past months. UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, reported a significant surge in military air strikes on civilians over the past five months. He estimated that approximately 2.7 million people have been displaced, with an additional million expected to join them by the end of 2024. Andrews highlighted the dire humanitarian situation, and stated that 18.6 million people, including six million children, require urgent assistance.
Second, constructive dialogue among all parties concerned shall commence to seek a peaceful solution in the interests of the people. Both sides, ie, the opposition parties as well as the military regime has vehemently refused to engage with each other. Min Hlaing at various speeches has pledged to eliminate all resistance to his leadership. The regime has labelled prominent opposition entities like the National Unity Government (NUG) and its armed branch, the People’s Defence Force (PDF), as terrorist groups. Aung San Suu Kyi has recently been moved out of prison to house arrest, but still she is placed under 27 years of imprisonment under various charges. Various other NLD members are either arrested or detained under counter-terrorism law targeting and incarcerating opposition politicians.
Constructive dialogue cannot occur under these circumstances where people are unjustly imprisoned, arbitrarily detained and even executed. Additionally, the military regime introduced various rules to exclude the NLD members from the elections process. Last year, the regime dissolved over 40 political parties, including Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD), for not meeting registration requirements. While he has extended invitations for peace discussions to ethnic armed organisations, these initiatives are not effective.
To implement this second provision, Indonesia as a chair in 2023, engaged with NUG and other stakeholders and conducted 110 meetings. However, ASEAN’s decision to engage with opposition groups, including the NUG, was criticised by Myanmar’s military. Earlier the NUG expressed support for ASEAN’s engagement and called for expanding the FPC, but later, it rejected Indonesia’s assertion for an “inclusive dialogue,” stating that it has no intention to engage in talks with the military. The NUG also urged the international community not to support Indonesia’s proposed solution of “inclusive dialogue.” It must also be noted that individual ASEAN countries have engaged with the NUG, but ASEAN as an organisation has not yet done so officially. For instance, Malaysian Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Saifuddin Abdullah became the first minister from ASEAN to publicly meet a NUG minister.
Third and fourth provisions can be read together. While the third provision calls for a need of a special envoy of the ASEAN Chair to facilitate mediation of the dialogue process has been implemented but with limited success. Fourth, the special envoy and delegation to visit Myanmar to meet with all parties concerned has again not been successful. Brunei, Cambodia and Indonesia, as ASEAN chairs in 2021, 2022 and 2023 respectively, excluded Myanmar’s military foreign minister from meetings and sought to pressure the military to adhere to the FPC. However, little progress was reported.
Two summits were hosted under Indonesia’s chairmanship, where ASEAN reaffirmed the FPC as the main reference for addressing the crisis in Myanmar and urged constructive dialogue with stakeholders. However, ASEAN’s divided approach became evident in 2023, with Thailand holding consultations with Myanmar’s military representatives and engaging with Suu Kyi outside the ASEAN framework. But now under the leadership of Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, Thailand has shifted its policy towards Myanmar, moving away from previous support for the military to now fully committed to implementing ASEAN’s FPC.
To further pressurise Myanmar, ASEAN leaders denied Myanmar its turn in the rotating presidency in 2026 and established a troika system involving Indonesia, Malaysia, and Laos to address the Myanmar crisis. Myanmar’s growing isolation was evident at the recent ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat, where it sent a non-political representative for the first time since the 2021 coup. With Laos, chairing ASEAN in 2024, Laos appointed Alounkeo Kittikhoun, as special envoy to Myanmar. In January 2024, Alounkeo met Min Aung Hlaing and discussed various peace initiatives.
Finally, the fifth provision of providing humanitarian assistance through the AHA Centre has been delivered with limited success. So far, ASEAN has provided medical supplies and equipment worth USD 1.1 million to the Myanmar Red Cross Society. In addition, individual countries have taken humanitarian initiatives. Recently, Thailand initiated a humanitarian corridor to deliver aid to Myanmar, sending the first batch of assistance worth around $138,000 to Karen State. The initiative was endorsed by ASEAN foreign ministers in January 2024. However, concerns remain about the aid’s effectiveness and distribution, as it is expected to benefit only areas under the control of the Myanmar military.
According to the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS) analyses, Myanmar falls under the category of extreme access constraints across all three categories used to rank and compare humanitarian access levels worldwide. These three categories are: Access of People in Need to Humanitarian Aid, Access of Humanitarian Organisations to People in Need and Security and Physical Constraints. In addition to these three constraints, we can add the legal framework as well. For instance, in October 2022, the Myanmar military passed the Organisation Registration Law, which imposed criminal penalties on humanitarian organisations that fail to register with the authorities. Amnesty International has reported instances of the military obstructing humanitarian assistance through bureaucratic hurdles. Additionally, UNOCHA’s report also highlighted that Myanmar ranked second globally in the number of aid workers killed and fourth in the number injured in 2022.
Even though ASEAN statements reaffirm the FPC as a primary reference, it acknowledges the FPC’s incomplete implementation and plans a comprehensive review at the upcoming summit. In November 2022 and September 2023, the ASEAN member states reviewed the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus (RDI-5PC), which served as an extension of the FPC. They condemned the ongoing violence in Myanmar and acknowledged that substantial progress has not been made. They also agreed on flexible and informal engagement with stakeholders, particularly the NUG, which should be facilitated by the ASEAN special envoy. However, there is concern about the lack of progress by the Myanmar authorities in implementing the FPC. Last year on the second two-year anniversary of FPC in 2023, lawmakers from Southeast Asia urged ASEAN to acknowledge the failure of the FPC signed in April 2021 regarding Myanmar.
During the two review meetings, they made key decisions including maintaining the FPC as the main reference for addressing the crisis, urging the Myanmar Armed Forces to de-escalate violence, and continuing engagements with relevant stakeholders in Myanmar. Furthermore, both in 2022 and 2023 at the RDI-5PC, ASEAN leaders emphasised the importance of collaboration with the UN, ASEAN dialogue partners, and the international community to support the FPC’s implementation. At the 2023 RDI-5PC, they specifically focussed on including neighbouring countries to address the crisis and its impacts. Furthermore, Human Rights Watch (HRW) urged Southeast Asian governments to overhaul their response to Myanmar’s military by collaborating with the wider international community. Additionally, the report of the International Parliamentary Inquiry (IPI) organised by APHR in November 2022 concluded that the FPC had proven ineffective, necessitating a new approach.
Strengthening ASEAN’s Response
ASEAN adopts a cautious approach in its dealings with Myanmar, in line with its principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. This principle, enshrined in documents like the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) of 1976, emphasises each state’s right to govern without external interference and promotes peaceful conflict resolution. Therefore, ASEAN’s restrained involvement in Myanmar’s crises should be viewed in the context of its institutional and diplomatic principles. As the crisis enters its fourth year, here are a few suggestions which can help ASEAN implement the FPC.
First, ASEAN must continue mediating between all parties involved in Myanmar’s peace process, including the NUG and other EAOs. Here, it is important to reassess the role of ASEAN Special Envoy. Previous envoys faced challenges in their missions, reflecting ASEAN’s internal divisions. Indonesia established the Office of the Special Envoy in Jakarta to engage stakeholders. ASEAN leaders must immediately institutionalise the envoy role with clear terms of reference and appoint a diplomat beyond the chair’s tenure for continuity and effectiveness. Second, it is often suggested that ASEAN leaders must move beyond ASEAN countries, and involve regional players to address the crisis in Myanmar. ASEAN plus Neighbourhood countries, involving India, China and Bangladesh could provide an appropriate platform to address the crisis which affects the region as a whole.
Finally for the people of Myanmar who are in dire need of humanitarian assistance, efforts must be made to build coalitions/partners to establish humanitarian corridors. UN Special Envoy Dr. Noeleen Heyzer called for a united regional approach to end violence and establish a protection framework for vulnerable populations in Myanmar, urging ASEAN to discuss regional refugee protection and monitor violence. Thailand and Malaysia play crucial roles due to their proximity to Myanmar. India, Bangladesh and China could also establish corridors with ASEAN nations to support these humanitarian efforts. The NUG also proposed an alternative assistance plan of working with local civil society organisations to reach areas controlled by ethnic resistance groups.
These steps, if taken immediately, may hold some potential to slow down the violence and instability in the country. In the long run, if ASEAN leaders are unable to enforce any progress in the FPC, then collectively the leaders may need to reassess its relationship with Myanmar, potentially necessitating more assertive action against the military regime. To conclude, it is well accepted that the current crisis in Myanmar is due to internal challenges. Therefore, there is a need for a “Myanmar-owned and led solution” as stated by ASEAN foreign ministers, during a meeting in Laos.
Additional Information
Publisher’s Note: Phadke Journal of Strategic Studies (PJSS) remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. All the views and opinions expressed are those of the author. Image Credit – Reuters.
About the Author
Dr. Cchavi Vasisht is currently a research associate at Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), India. She holds a PhD in International Relations and Affairs from Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU).
Competing Interests
The author declares no competing interests.
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