India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Strategy of Deterrence and No First Use

By Mohammad Taha Ali

Abstract

India’s nuclear doctrine is derived from a concept of deterrence and No First Use (NFU), so that any nuclear war is avoided by having credible minimum deterrence. The NFU doctrine, announced in 1999, only states India’s firm commitment to the exercise of restraint and responsibility in the use of nuclear weapons, which are meant purely as weapons of deterrence. The NFU policy in itself means that India should not be the first to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, and still maintaining the right to do so if it comes under nuclear attack. This policy results into decreased risks of nuclear escalation in the entire region, especially with India’s rising but uncertain relations with Pakistan and China both being nuclear weapons states. This paper presents an elucidation and grounding on the premises and consequences of a synthetic Indian national policy on its national security architecture, and infers its bearing on regional and global peace.

Introduction

India’s nuclear doctrine, evolving from its formation in 1999 perennially remains crucial to its national security strategy, while getting firmed on two fundamental pillars credible minimum deterrence along the Non-First Use (NFU) policy. With an emphasis on ensuring that India is equipped with a nuclear arsenal strong enough to deter nuclear threats from any possibility, the doctrine commits India against the use of nuclear weapons as the first initiator of an attack. This makes nuclear weapons merely an option in deterrence as a last resort purely for national defence against any nuclear assault. In particular, the NFC policy hugely emphasises the seriousness of India’s reputation as a responsible nuclear country implying its decision not to undertake more aggressive nuclear posturing. India’s nuclear doctrine bears significance beyond the borders of the country.

The existence within a nuclear neighbourhood marred by persisting tensions with Pakistan and China is an equaliser to this doctrine which in general helps to stabilise the situation by reducing nuclear confrontation chances. The global platform of nuclear restraint and deterrence further contributes to the contemplation of nonproliferation which in one way or the other builds India’s image even more as a responsible stakeholder in the global security. This paper aims to provide an overview of India’s nuclear doctrine addressing its strategic justification, the challenges it confronts and more importantly the future of the doctrine.

This was brought into question as Pakistan embarked on the development of a tactical nuclear weaponry process leading to further queries concerning the future applicability of the NFC policy by India. This paper also delves into these discussions about how India may balance national security with its broader responsibility to pursue regional stability and global nonproliferation efforts. This paper argues that while India’s nuclear doctrine remains extremely pertinent for a stabilisation of the regional security dynamics, it continues to face many challenges in a security environment that is becoming increasingly complex.

Historical Background

India’s nuclear race commenced in the late 1940’s just after becoming independent. The initial vision was to develop a nuclear technology for peace-building purposes. However, the peaceful intentions soon became smudged by considerations of security dynamics. The initial attempts to induce India to join the global nuclear market while announcing the need against weapons proliferation was during Pokhran 1 in 1974 and it was termed a peaceful nuclear explosion. These factors strained regional tensions in the wake of a successful test of the Chinese bomb in 1964 and a fast-developing nuclear program in Pakistan that kept inducing India to rethink its nuclear strategy. By the late 1990’s more explicit discussion on deterrence had begun. After the 1971 war Pakistan’s subsequent military endeavours to acquire nuclear weapons as countermeasures against India’s superpower status in nuclear arms began festering security concerns with Pakistan. The modernisation of Chinese nuclear warfare together with tensions along the borders with India reinforced the urgent need for India to take steps to fortify its security.

The tests of 1998 which are collectively known as Pokhran 2 not only declared India a nuclear weapons power but indeed had vast implications flowing from sound reasoning that India was committed to showcasing its belligerency against its immediate threats to the autonomy of its strategic posture. Thus, from 1999 onwards, India’s nuclear doctrine was established after the 1998 detonation concentrating on two well-defined tenets; ‘minimum credible deterrence and no first use.’ This was a declaration of India’s aspiration to keep a nuclear weapons stockpile at a strength sufficient to deter nuanced nuclear or conventional aggressions, contending that an adequate size would elicit assurance without any overt aggression intents.

In the nuclear lexicon, deterrence can be defined as a state’s ability to deny its opponents the possibility of successfully attacking it by credibility-threatening retaliation. Credible minimum deterrence emphasises that one needs a nuclear stockpile sufficient to stave off an adversary without similarly steering the arms race into expensive and destabilising waters. For India, credible minimum deterrence is being capable and indeed of assurances provided by a threat of massive retaliation of counter giving a retaliatory strike against the background whereby no adversary gleans determinate advantage from a first strike against India. On the strategic plane deterrence for India has revolved around the principle of keeping a small but effective nuclear arsenal. India unlike nuclear superpowers opted out of the birds for a race to accumulate an enormous stockpile of nuclear weapons. India’s nuclear posture consists of providing minimal yet reliable and durable second-strike capability carried out to cause population extinction on the aggressor side once attacked with a nuclear stick.

This posture aptly reflects India’s strategic stance of restrainedness a balance between national security and regional stability. Credibility is an important element in the deterrence strategy for India. For deterrence to be credible, India must have nuclear capabilities that are seen as operational and survivable. This triad is maintainable through a diversity of delivery system that brings in land-based ballistic missiles, SLBMs, and air-dropped nuclear bombs. In this manner even if one leg of the weapons system is compromised, India retains the ability to strike back. Moreover, India’s nuclear posture remains fundamentally defensive signifying its commitment to a credible but minimal deterrent nor excessive nuclear stockpiles. In the South Asian theatre, India’s credible minimal deterrence targets two nuclear adversaries Pakistan and China. The purpose of this deterrent is to counter Islamabad, first use has become much more entrenched with Pakistan’s inductance of tactical nuclear weapons.

India intends to induce Pakistan into refraining from considering a first-use nuclear strike a monumental retaliation would be visited upon it, resulting in devastation beyond imagination. The deterrence of China is complicated by the fact that China is substantially modernising and enhancing its nuclear capabilities. Although China adheres to an NFC policy, its rapid accumulation of nuclear warheads and missile technology is putting pressure on India to keep its deterrence credible. Modernisation of capabilities became therefore another feature of India’s posture and with this came the range of missiles with the Agni series that enabled India to retain regionally effective deterrence.

No-First Use Policy: India’s Nuclear Doctrine and its Strategic Significance

India has adopted as one of the fundamental principles of its nuclear doctrine the NFU policy, which states the nation shall not use nuclear weapons unless there is a first strike aimed at it with a nuclear payload. Through this policy integrating strategic and ethical justification India financially keeps a deterrent in place to project itself as a responsible nuclear state. At a strategic level, the NFU is designed to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war in South Asia, an inherently volatile region containing perennial fault lines, notably with neighbouring Pakistan. This commitment would also reduce even more the risk of an accidental or pre-emptive attack since nuclear forces would not be maintained at higher-trigger alert. Accordingly, there is a lesser probability that escalatory moves toward conflicts may be mistakenly dignified as an authorising of the feint of employing nuclear weapons in launched attacks in circumstances of stressful situations.

On the other hand, ethically NFU resonates with the broader historical principles of non-violence and peaceful coexistence espoused by India as one may note its ongoing advocacy of global disarmament and non-proliferation norms. Regional balance furnishing seeks to ensure that rival states are not under excessive pressure to cause an arms race or adopt similar aggressive stances towards one another. The NFU policy allows India to feel at ease about its image as a nuclear power responsible for global security. Indicative of modernisation India’s dedication to not be the first to employ nuclear weapons is juxtaposed against the more hazardous nuclear positions adopted by various nuclear states.

It is of wider import to global tranquility and asserts the cause that nuclear weapons work mainly as deterrents and ought never to see occupational use during war. Such nuclear policy formation can lessen irrational behaviour while determining nuclear relations as it has confined the operational capabilities of its nuclear arsenal to pure retaliation in the face of nuclear threats as any pre-emptive strike by these weapons implies a selfish objective while going to war. This policy has made India an NFU nation and, thus, makes it significant in promoting the global nuclear norm formation of no-first-use if adhered to by those having transgressed as a result of US reversal on NFU repairable stability a final time besides establishing India as the champion for global responsibility and peace.

India’s Nuclear Modernisation and Deterrence Capability

The defence strategy is a far-reaching component of India’s program of nuclear modernisation which calls for credible deterrence and rapidly evolving security dynamics. As nuclear weapons and delivery technologies develop in sophistication sweeping undertakings are underway in India to improve its nuclear deterrent posture and to sustain a credible deterrent against hostile states. Attention over the years has entered on missile technology enhancement of its sea-based nuclear deterrence survivability and efficacy of nuclear arsenal in the face of the threats that have arisen. A major area of nuclear modernisation is advanced missile technology in which India has developed and operationally deployed a range of ballistic missiles from short to long-range missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads as part of the Agni series. The Agni-5 reportedly has a range of over 5,000 km thereby giving India a strategic intercontinental reach and thus, greatly increasing its second-strike capability.

Along with these projects, India intends to develop hypersonic missile technology and eventually improve the accuracy and reliability of its missile system to foster a credible deterrent. Such initiatives should be pitched at counter-renovating India’s dethroning Chinese and Pakistani ambitions, especially in the nuclear arms race. Another major component of the modernisation program is the development of a sea-based nuclear deterrent to be conducted through nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The induction of INS Arihant and its successors occupies centre stage in India’s endeavour to establish a full-fledged and survivable second strike capability. The sea-based deterrent bears importance for India as it provides for country’s ability to retaliate even if its adversary manages to launch a successful first strike. With the emergence of new advanced technologies by adversaries the credibility of deterrence is further augmented thereby motivating India to keep its nuclear forces survivable.

Continuous investment into the nuclear domain confirms that India remains steadfast against all threats imagining and possibilities. In so doing modern command and control systems are expected to be augmented in such a way that the Indian command can command its nuclear forces effectively during any crisis ensuring operational communication and so on. Even modernising its nuclear forces, India believes this will act as a counter to regional adversaries and modern warfare phenomena like cyber-warfare ballistic missile defence space-based capabilities, etc. It must also therefore maintain each credible nuclear deterrent the nation is banking on to counter newer threats, and these modernisation tendencies do keep the regional stability intact.

Conclusion

While not a signatory to the NPT, India will still have its nuclear doctrine play a big part in support of the threats of nuclear non-proliferation over the globe. Its nuclear conduct has thus far been acknowledged as a responsible nuclear non-proliferation since 1998 when it conducted its nuclear tests. India has for all the years maintained a strict policy of non-transfer of nuclear technology or material to other states and has supported on a global scale, initiatives to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Aspiring to become members of the nuclear supplier’s group only serves to demonstrate this continued commitment to non-proliferation regardless of other pressures.

Looking ahead, India must seek to adapt its deterrence capabilities to address emerging evolving threats, like missile defence and high technology. That would be the crucial balancing act in maintaining regional stability and global security. Continuous dialogues on nuclear risk reduction at the regional and global levels are extremely important to promote a non-proliferation order of nuclear weapons and a safer world for all of us in the future.

All the views and opinions expressed are those of the author. Image Credit – Sputnik.

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