Post-1998 Nuclearisation: A New Paradigm for Peace-building Between India and Pakistan

By Mohammad Taha Ali

Abstract

Since 1998, when India and Pakistan were nuclearised, South Asian security dynamics have taken to a new dimension quite unprecedented in history. This paper is, therefore, intended to set the stage for what it means in terms of peace-building between the two; I argue that nuclear weapons now changed the very basic rules of the game of standard approaches towards conflict resolution and securing stability. The paper reviews major crises and diplomatic actions since the nuclear tests and shows that while nuclear deterrence has restrained peace efforts, at the same time, it generated fertile ground for them. While mutually assured destruction might deter full-scale war, the paradox of stability and instability has reinforced that atmosphere in which certain minor conflicts and violence, through unorganised or stateless entities, can go on.

The work underscores some of the ideas of the stability-instability paradox and third-party mediators in peace-building, affirming the need for nuclear-sensitive innovative peace-building methodologies. The discussion also highlights the dialogue and confidence-building measures of utmost importance, particularly in aspects of trade, cultural exchange, and environmental cooperation. On a different note, this learned that even though nuclearity has changed the security equation in South Asia, it did provide additional avenues by which durable peace could be achieved if the two nations would regard their traditional challenges cooperatively.

Introduction

A central component of the theoretical understanding of nuclear deterrence between nuclear-armed states such as India and Pakistan is based on the foundation of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Simply stated, the concept of MAD means that if either state initiates a full-scale war against the other, both would be able to inflict unacceptable levels of damage on each other. This fear of ultimate destruction forces rational actors to stop massive military operations in the event of war. The first-strike capability which means the state’s possibility to conduct a preemptive nuclear attack that can destroy the opponent’s nuclear abilities and the second-strike capability, meaning the state possesses a guarantee of retaliation even after suffering a nuclear attack are essential components of this peculiarity. Concerning India and Pakistan it is mostly the grapevines that have dictated strategic thinking on how to achieve credible second-strike capability on both sides as a means of reducing the temptation for either to be a first-strike advocate.

The impact of this has been an important deterrent effect that has acted as an important factor in the massive restraint of full-scale wars between the two countries since 1998 when both sides attained nuclear status. The establishment of nuclear-sensitive approaches, with actions not to address both the direct risks of nuclear conflict and the persistent, low-intensity tensions that remain hostage to the stability-instability paradox is thus imperative. Such initiatives might include but are not limited to the creation of CBMs, stronger military hotlines, and encouragements in diplomatic interaction particularly relating to nuclear risk reduction. Other non-conventional efforts that ought to be given a go are other initiatives like a cooperation program in economic, cultural exchange, and environmental cooperation, which can in due course build confidence between often battling nations India and Pakistan. Trade relations agreements, water management shared projects, and cultural diplomacy can reduce anathemas and develop an environment conducive to sustainable peace.

Therefore, the additional challenge for the peace-builder is to fairly build strategies in contexts with nuclear realities with long-term conflict resolution objectives that create stability while considering and bearing in mind the emerging risks of nuclear weapons. In the spirit of that paradox, peace initiatives in a nuclearised South Asia should be sensitive to unique challenges posed by nuclear deterrence. Nuclear factors now add a layer to traditional peace-building endeavours focusing on dialogue, diplomacy, and CBMs, not the least of which could avoid unfortunate miscalculations. However, such peace-building efforts must create avenues for either country to be able to maintain channels open to avoid miscalculations, especially at crisis times. Such establishment of nuclear-sensitive approaches, with measures towards not just addressing both the direct risks of nuclear conflict and the ongoing, low-level tensions that stand at the mercy of the stability-instability paradox, is critical. Such steps could include, but not be limited to: expanding CBMs, stronger military hotlines, and promoting diplomatic engagement with the intent of nuclear risk reduction.

Evolution of India-Pakistan Relations post-1998

The situation drastically changed following a series of nuclear tests conducted by India in Pokhran in May 1998, which declared it a nuclear-armed state. Only weeks later, Pakistan conducted its nuclear tests in Chagai, making a significant turning point in the strategic environment of South Asia. This mutual declaration of nuclear capability led to a fundamental shift in the regional security dynamics that made warfare much more drastic for the approaches both countries would use in defence and diplomacy. While this move led to a stern check against war, it brought a level of sophistication into the bilateral relationship between the two countries because each entered into a precarious balance of power marked by mutually assured destruction. The nuclearisation of India and Pakistan also riveted international attention with this growing feeling of concern regarding nuclear proliferation and the potential peril of a war between two rival states with nuclear weapons.

Since 1998, a succession of major crises has characterised the bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan, which has consistently tested the limits of nuclear deterrence. Just a year after both had announced their acquisition of nuclear weapons, open hostilities erupted in the 1999 Kargil War, during which Pakistani forces along with militants invaded Indian positions in the Kargil region of Jammu and Kashmir. Although this was a local conflict, nuclear weapons loomed over the situation, and international pressure, particularly from the United States, contributed significantly to the de-escalation of the crisis. It represented one of the first instances in which nuclear deterrence helped to prevent escalation into an all-out war. Similarly, the 2001-2002 standoff, when militants based in Pakistan attacked India’s Parliament brought the two nations on the brink of war. Both sides held troops close to the border for almost a year, but the fear of nuclear retaliation restrained them from crossing into full-scale conflict. The 2008 Mumbai attacks by Pakistani militants again escalated tensions.

Although the initial response from India was circumspect, the diplomatic pressure along with nuclear deterrence stopped the conflict from going on the military cleavage. These two crises take up the fact that nuclear weapons have worked not only as a deterrent but also as a complicating factor to the Indo-Pak rivalry, both countries being wary of developing any further conflict beyond a certain limit. In this very way, nuclearisation has had paradoxical implications for peace-building efforts between India and Pakistan. However, the threat of nuclear weapons has created a kind of ceiling on conflict between both countries, which keeps them away from indulging in full-scale wars that might gradually progress into a nuclear war. This has, in a way, preserved “negative peace,” in which the disbelief in mutual war is only kept because of the fear of mutual annihilation. However, the nuclear shadow has also constrained peaceful endeavours.

The two nations have been in a straitjacket of deterrence and continue to think more of strategic balance than of durable peace. Many diplomatic endeavours, the Lahore Declaration of 1999 and Agra Summit of 2001, to address some of the longstanding issues like Kashmir were masked by the ever-present undertow of being militarily prepared. However, at the same time, the very nuclear deterrence offers both countries scope for dialogue since both nations realise the catastrophic after-effects of unrestricted war. Confidence-building measures, nuclear risk reduction treaties, and back channel diplomacy, among others, have only gained much significance during the nuclear age since it is a way of averting potential miscommunication and accidental escalation, even though strong mistrust continues to stall greater peace efforts.

Theory of Nuclear Deterrence: The Fundamentals of Deterrence and Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)

The logic of nuclear deterrence is predicated on the existence of a threshold for major conflicts among states such that because the costs of wars are too high, no present state will initiate a conflict when there exists in a particular dyad a level of nuclear weapon capability sufficient to ensure widespread destruction if war were launched. At its core, the doctrine of mutually assured destruction holds that both antagonists possess nuclear ability capable of causing devastation to each other that could never be tolerated in a scenario of war. The prospect of utter and total destruction acts as one of the most potent deterrents against any form of massive war. Thus, in the case of India and Pakistan, for instance, each country still possesses nuclear arsenals that can strike principal cities and military bases. A total war in this situation would not only be undesirable but catastrophic. Therefore, the fear of nuclear escalation has kept both nations from garrisoning forces in any form of high-intensity war, as it would seem suicidal for either side.

This creates a strategic environment in which neither country is willing to risk an open conflict, opting instead for restraint during moments of high tension, the weapons standing as a deterrent to war. The stability-instability paradox complicates peace-building efforts between India and Pakistan by fostering a cycle of mistrust and low-intensity conflict. The nuclear deterrent may inhibit a great war, but it simultaneously creates a security dilemma in which both nations become committed to purchasing more armaments, both nuclear and conventional, in preparation for projected future conflicts. Such an arms race runs counter to long-run efforts at peace and diverts resources from economic and social development. In addition, low-intensity conflict–for example, cross-border skirmishes and insurgency–undermines peace negotiations. Each side mistrusts the other, and this mistrust is reinforced by the presence of nuclear weapons: any such conflict is a zero-sum game.

But the nuclear context also opens up some differentiated opportunities for peace-building. The grave implications of nuclear war have also made both India and Pakistan rely more on CBMs, aimed at reducing the possibility of an unintended escalation. Among the many elements included in these CBMs are military leaders’ hotlines, pre-test missile test notification agreements, and discussions on nuclear risk reduction. All these are essential building blocks to maintain continued contact throughout the crisis as well as avoid potential misunderstandings causing inadvertent escalation. A nuclear deterrent has opened an opportunity for diplomatic communication about other, less contentious issues: trade, water-sharing, and environmental cooperation. The stakes are presumably lower, but the returns are likely higher. The gradual building of trust in these domains may perhaps open up conditions for negotiations over more contentious issues, such as Kashmir or terrorism.

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)

India and Pakistan have devised several Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) to reduce tensions and avoid a miscalculation that could precipitate conflict. Crucially, the CBMs have sought to institutionalise a direct hotline between the two militaries in each other’s command structures. Such hotline communication can facilitate clarification of intent at moments of crisis, thus reducing tensions immediately. The other significant CBMs include the 2003 ceasefire agreement along the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir. That incident has reduced the frequency of cross-border skirmishes but violation still occurs. The two countries also established nuclear risk reduction centres as dedicated facilities for the exchange of information regarding nuclear arsenals and missile tests. These centres promote transparency and reduce the risk of accidental escalation.

Other CBMs include advance notification of ballistic missile tests and bilateral meetings on security issues. While these mechanisms have some success in lessening the immediate tensions, deep-seated mistrust remains a spoiler for their effectiveness. To establish long-term peace, both India and Pakistan would need new avenues for cooperation beyond these old-school security provisions. One very promising area relates to nuclear safety, where the two countries can engage each other in best practices for securing and managing their nuclear arsenals. Joint training exercises focused on nuclear safety can facilitate an atmosphere for building trust and increasing the overall security of both nations’ nuclear programs. Mechanisms for trade and economic cooperation might also be an effective tool for peace-building. The creation of interdependence between the two states through trade would also make both nations more interested in holding on to peace. Steps to decrease tariffs as well as encouraging bilateral investment and the facilitation of trading of key goods would strengthen their economic links and reduce hostility.

Cultural exchange contributes much to peace-building as well. People-to-people contact can also be promoted through programs such as student exchanges, artistic collaborations, joint sports events, and so on. Such programs help both populations bend stereotypes and understand each other. It could develop a sense of shared identity and promote a culture of peace, which in turn challenges the narratives that fuel conflict. Apart from this, cooperation on environmental issues such as water sharing and climate change will provide a neutral ground upon which to discuss matters from which collaboration will benefit the two countries while keeping minimal political tensions. Whereas nuclear deterrence creates an environment of fear, trade, and cultural relations open doors to mutual gain and cooperation.

When the countries’ economies coincide with each other in their interests, the prospects for war are greatly reduced because each will be more aware that instability could jeopardise their economies. Trade can encourage interdependence, making the cost of conflict too steep to attempt for both sides. Furthermore, cultural exchange promotes a sense of mutual understanding and universal humanity that can be bigger than petty politics. In the context of a common historical background and shared cultural heritage, both nations can open up a constructive dialogue that can shatter the prevailing narratives of enmity. Efforts towards the building of this peace structure by Indians and Pakistanis have to focus on fundamental aspects such as the need for trade as well as their cultural ties towards making it resilient against the persistently posed geopolitical challenges. Existing CBMs have laid a foundation of dialogue and de-escalation, so new initiatives on nuclear safety, trade, cultural exchange, and environmental cooperation are necessary to move forward in peace-building. Prioritising these areas between India and Pakistan will work to create a more stable, peaceful relationship and one in which cooperation outweighs conflict.

Future Prospects: Nuclear-Sensitive Peace-building Methodologies

Against such a backdrop, peace-building strategies as mentioned above are more often than not rendered ineffective when the reality of nuclear presence forces parties into this relationship onto the trajectory of strategic fear, mutual distrust, and competition. Therefore much creative peace-building is in order when sensitive to such realities of nuclear deterrence. This includes nuclear-sensitive peace-building, which also has to assume the paradoxical situation of a nuclear arsenal generating stability but fostering instability at the same time. Consequently, there is a need for methodologies toward cooperation instead of tolerating each other’s atomic threats. Such cooperative avenues may comprise collaborative research on both states’ common challenges; for example, climate change and water resource management. Collaborative projects can then be built upon to tap the knowledge available in both nations, hence developing solutions to these much-needed causes and both nations having something to lose if war is resumed.

For instance, joint studies on transboundary river systems will help reduce tensions over water sharing; laying down frameworks for the equitable distribution of resources. Moreover, expanding environmental cooperation could help to increase mutual trust for mutual benefit while simultaneously handling the more global aspects of climate change, which is a huge threat to both nations. The dialogue on the non-traditional security threats of terrorism and cyber threats could form a basis for increased communication and coordination, thereby allowing both sides to become partners in working against such common dangers.

Even more importantly, building an atmosphere of cooperative security does not involve abandoning nuclear deterrents but changing the character of nuclear capabilities into a base for mutual security, not rivalry. By highlighting cooperative activities such as joint military manoeuvres and measures that mitigate risk shared, India and Pakistan can strengthen stability while recognising the deterrent impact of their nuclear stockpiles. This shift into nuclear-sensitive peace-building promises a much safer and more stable South Asia in which cooperation finds the better of confrontation.

Conclusion

We can say that the nuclearisation of India and Pakistan changed the South Asian security paradigm fundamentally with constraints as well as opportunities in the peace-building processes. While it has deterred full-scale wars due to the presence of the nuclear factor, it has simultaneously fostered low-intensity conflicts through proxy wars and insurgencies in terms of creating a cycle of instability while enjoying stability. This type of paradox is a stability-instability paradox, and it draws many complications upon the traditional peace efforts. Existing CBMs established the environment in which dialogue has taken place, but deeply ingrained mistrust and still very present regional tensions inform innovation and prioritisation toward a nuclear-sensitive methodology; those are peace-building measures underscored by cooperation in new security areas, such as climate change, water sharing, or cultural exchange.

Slightly easier economic interdependence and cooperative problem-solving may make India and Pakistan’s environment more stable and tractable to dialogue. The calls for sustainable dialogue and cooperation have never been more timely as the prospect for both countries of increasingly complicated geopolitics lies ahead. Ultimately, the nuclear-sensitive peace initiatives take a good step toward an enduring and safe South Asia wherein at least mutual interests prevail over deeply entrenched animosities, a climate that allows mutual trust and eradicates the dark shadows of nuclear deterrence.

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